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S 
ince the outbreak of the global financial crisis, regu-
lators have increased their focus on the ability of 
banks to measure and manage liquidity risk.  In Decem-
ber 2009, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(“the Basel Committee”) identified “ineffective” liquid-
ity management as a key characteristic of the crisis and 
highlighted the lack of attention that liquidity risk re-
ceived relative to other risks prior to the crisis.
1  Recog-
nizing the key role of illiquidity in the crisis, the Basel 
Committee included two global minimum liquidity stan-
dards as part of the recently announced Basel III supervi-
sory framework to be implemented over the next seven 
years.
2  Notably, regulators in a number of Asian econo-
mies have had prudential liquidity standards in place for 
many years.  This Asia Focus report defines liquidity and 
liquidity risk, examines some common prudential liquid-
ity standards in key Asian economies, and briefly con-
siders the potential impact of the proposed Basel III stan-
dards on global liquidity risk management. 
Liquidity and Liquidity Risk 
Banking regulators generally define liquidity as a bank’s 
ability to fund its operations and meet its obligations, 
expected or unexpected.  Liquidity risk is the chance that 
a bank will be unable to meet these requirements and 
will face losses as a result.  More specifically, banks face 
two main types of liquidity risk: funding liquidity risk, 
which is the risk of being unable to obtain necessary 
funds at a reasonable cost; and asset liquidity risk, which 
is the risk of being unable to liquidate assets as necessary 
and at an acceptable price.  Liquidity risk is fundamental 
to the business of banks and other financial intermediar-
ies, which raise money through liabilities such as depos-
its or borrowings to fund the creation or purchase of 
earning assets such as loans or securities. 
To manage liquidity risk, banks must balance their port-
folios of assets and liabilities, while considering the 
trade-off between return and liquidity on the asset side, 
and cost, ease of procurement, and volatility on the li-
ability side.  Assets with relatively higher returns tend to 
be less liquid and therefore more difficult to sell if a 
bank needs to raise funds.  Liabilities with higher costs, 
such as brokered deposits, can generally provide funds 
quickly, but are often volatile as providers may withdraw 
funds quickly to earn higher returns elsewhere.  Banking 
regulators supervise banks’ liquidity risk management   
on a continual basis by requiring banks to use a variety 
of qualitative and quantitative tools to monitor and meas-
ure liquidity.  One common tool regulators use is a pru-
dential liquidity standard, typically a numerical bench-
mark that establishes a maximum or minimum level of 
assets and liabilities that banks must hold.  Most regula-
tors also require banks to meet a broader set of liquidity 
requirements and expectations to supplement these nu-
merical requirements (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1 – Alternative Liquidity  
Standards, Requirements and Expectations 
Although most regulators in Asia impose some degree of 
prudential liquidity standards that are explicitly stated in 
guidelines, regulations or laws, regulators also rely on a 
number of less explicit standards, requirements and expec-
tations.  These typically reflect the size and complexity of 
a bank’s operations, as well as the sophistication of its 
liquidity risk management policies and procedures.   
For example, Japan’s Financial Services Agency (JFSA), 
which does not require banks to meet any specific pruden-
tial liquidity standard or benchmark, publishes broad 
guidelines that it expects banks to follow in managing 
their liquidity risk.  These guidelines include the develop-
ment of a liquidity risk management system that is 
“appropriate” and “suited to the financial institution’s 
strategic objectives, the scale and nature of its business, 
and its risk profile.”
3  The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
(BSP) follows a similar approach.  It also does not require 
banks to use specific liquidity ratios but expects them to 
use an appropriate combination of “simple calculations, 
static simulations based on current holdings, or sophisti-
cated models.”
4  Regulators in the United States encour-
age banks to rely on a similar basket of tools to measure 
and manage liquidity risk, without requiring specific pru-
dential benchmarks or standards (Figure 2).   
Even where regulators do require such benchmarks or 
standards, however, most also require banks to supple-
ment these with an appropriate combination of internal 
standards and other techniques to manage their liquidity 
risk. Prudential Liquidity Standards in Asia 
Most banking regulators in Asia require banks to meet at least 
one prudential liquidity standard (Figure 2).  Prudential stan-
dards are typically described in official regulatory guidance or 
in relevant laws and regulations governing the banking sector 
in a given economy.  The most common prudential liquidity 
standard is to require banks to adhere to a fixed ratio of a spe-
cific class of assets relative to a specific class of liabilities (e.g., 
current assets to current liabilities).  Depending on the type of 
assets and liabilities the regulator decides to include in this ra-
tio, an institution may be required to maintain a minimum or a 
maximum amount of a certain type of asset.  This type of stan-
dard is static in that it measures a ratio of assets to liabilities at 
a given point in time.  A second common prudential liquidity 
standard is to require financial institutions to adjust assets and 
liabilities over a period of time to estimate their liquidity posi-
tion and cash flows under various scenarios.  These scenarios 
typically include changes to assets and liabilities during normal 
and abnormal business conditions, such as during a crisis.  This 
type of standard is dynamic in that it produces a ratio based 
upon estimated future changes in assets and liabilities. 
Static Liquidity Standards 
Static liquidity ratios may be broadly categorized into mini-
mum and maximum ratios.  The most common minimum ratio 
in use in Asia measures the proportion of liquid assets to a cer-
tain class of liabilities.  Although the definition of “liquid” var-
ies among regulators, common examples of liquid assets in-
clude cash, gold, government securities, short-term lending to 
other banks, and a number of other easily liquefiable and unen-
cumbered assets.
5  Regulators in the majority of Asian econo-
mies employ some variation of a liquidity ratio that requires a 
minimum level of liquid assets measured against specific 
liabilities. 
Regulators in China, Hong Kong, India, South Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand apply a “one-size-fits-all” mini-
mum liquid asset ratio which all banks under their super-
vision must meet on a regular basis.  The China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), for example, requires 
that banks meet a minimum liquidity ratio of 25%.
6  The 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority requires institutions to 
hold as of the end of each month at least 25% of one-
month liabilities in easily liquefiable assets.
7  The Re-
serve Bank of India (RBI) requires all institutions to hold 
enough liquid assets to cover at least 25% of demand and 
time deposits, although the RBI may increase this ratio to 
as high as 40%.
8  South Korea’s banking regulators, the 
Financial Supervisory Commission and the Financial 
Supervisory Service, require banks to maintain a one-to-
one ratio of Korean won-denominated current assets to 
won-denominated current liabilities.
9  Taiwan’s central 
bank, the Central Bank of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan), requires banks to maintain at least 7% of de-
posits and other designated liabilities in liquid assets.
10 
The Bank of Thailand requires banks to maintain at least 
6% of all deposits and borrowings in liquid assets.
11 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore’s (MAS) applica-
tion of its minimum liquid asset ratio differs slightly 
from other regulators in that the MAS requires banks to 
meet a risk-based minimum liquid asset ratio that reflects 
the sophistication of the bank’s liquidity risk manage-
ment.  In general, banks are required to hold 16% of 
qualifying liabilities in liquid assets on a daily basis.
12 
However, banks may apply for an alternative approach 
Figure 2 – Comparative Prudential Liquidity Requirements in Asia and the United States 
Economy  Key Liquidity Ratio(s)  Requirement 
China  1. Loans / Deposits 
2. Liquid Asset Ratio 
1. ≤ 75% 
2. ≥ 25% 
Hong Kong  Liquefiable Assets/ Qualifying Assets  ≥ 25% 
India  Liquid Assets / Demand and Time Liabilities  ≥ 25% (40% max.) 
Japan  No Specific Ratio (see Figure 1)  None 
Malaysia  Minimum Net Asset Requirement 
1. Positive net asset position assuming 
3% deposit runoff over a week 
2.  Positive net asset position assuming 
a 5% deposit runoff over a month 
Philippines  No Specific Ratio
13 (see Figure 1)  None 
Singapore  Liquid Assets / Qualifying Liabilities 
1. Bank-Specific: 10% to 15% 
2. Bank-General: ≥ 16% 
3. Bank Basic: ≥ 18% 
South Korea  1.  Current Won Assets / Current Won Liabilities 
2. Won Loans / Won Deposits (effective 2014) 
1. ≥ 100% 
2. ≤ 100% 
Taiwan  New Taiwan Dollar Liquid Assets / New Taiwan Dollar Liabilities  ≥ 7% 
Thailand  Liquid Assets / Deposits and Borrowings  ≥ 6% 
United States  No Specific Ratio (see Figure 1)  None 
Source: Financial regulatory authorities and laws and regulations of the respective economies. 
Note: This chart is not comprehensive and includes only the most common liquidity ratios in use by regulators and banks in Asia. under which they are required to maintain the higher of (i) 
a bank-specific ratio assigned by the MAS that is between 
10% and 15% of qualifying liabilities, or (ii) an amount 
based on calculation that considers a bank’s historical cash 
flow volatility.  Banks unable to comply with either of 
these two approaches may apply for a “bank basic” ap-
proach, which requires them to maintain an average liquid 
assets ratio of 18% over a two-week period rather than on a 
daily basis. 
A common maximum liquidity ratio utilized in Asia is the 
loan-to-deposit ratio, which restricts an institution’s lend-
ing to a specified percentage of deposits.   For example, the 
CBRC imposes a loan-to-deposit ratio that limits banks’ 
lending to no more than 75% of their total deposits.  Ko-
rean regulators plan to impose a similar statutory restriction 
on Korean banks with more than KRW 2 trillion (USD 1.8 
billion) in loans beginning in 2014.
14  Once the restriction 
takes effect, domestic currency lending of relevant banks 
will be capped at 100% of their domestic currency depos-
its. 
Dynamic Liquidity Standards 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) is one of the few regulators 
in Asia that requires financial institutions to meet a specific 
dynamic liquidity ratio.
15   BNM adopted this approach 
following the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, when it re-
placed a mandatory minimum liquid asset ratio with a new 
“liquidity framework” that “does not emphasize rigid com-
pliance with a particular liquidity ratio.”
16 Instead, the ap-
proach focuses on a bank’s ability to maintain enough liq-
uid assets to cover short-term cash outflows. A key feature 
of the liquidity framework is an assessment that considers 
an institution’s ability to maintain adequate liquidity over 
both the normal course of business and in the event of a 
sudden withdrawal of funds as might occur during a cri-
sis.
17 As part of the assessment, banks are required to cate-
gorize assets and liabilities into one of six “maturity buck-
ets” ranging from periods of less than one week to more 
than one year.
18  This allows banks to determine their net 
maturity mismatch: whether more assets or liabilities will 
mature at different points in the future.
19 Banks are then 
required to calculate their net maturity mismatch under two 
scenarios: (i) the sudden withdrawal of 3% of deposits over 
a one week period; (ii) and the sudden withdrawal of 5% of 
deposits over a one month period.  Under both scenarios 
banks must ensure that they hold enough liquid assets or 
have access to sufficient lines of credit to maintain a 
positive net maturity mismatch.  This ensures that banks 
hold sufficient liquidity to cover any sudden liquidity 
outflows over the course of one month, as might occur 
during a crisis.  
  
Moving Toward Global Liquidity Standards 
The lack of institutional and system-level liquidity dur-
ing the recent global financial crisis has led regulators to 
increase their focus on liquidity risk.  As a result of this 
increased focus, regulators agreed to work towards 
stronger internationally harmonized liquidity standards. 
The Basel Committee, which comprises senior supervi-
sory and central bank officials from 27 economies, has 
led this effort as part of a larger set of reform measures 
to strengthen global capital and liquidity rules.
20   These 
reforms, known as the Basel III Framework, introduce 
two new liquidity ratios as well as a set of common met-
rics that national regulators can use to identify and moni-
tor liquidity risks at both bank and system levels. 
The first of the two new liquidity ratios, the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR), is intended to serve as a gauge of 
short-term liquidity.  The LCR resembles the dynamic 
liquidity ratios discussed above in that it measures a 
bank’s liquidity position given a sudden short-term out-
flow of liabilities.  Specifically, it reflects a bank’s abil-
ity to convert high-quality, unencumbered liquid assets 
to cash to offset projected cash flows during a one-month 
period (Figure 3).  Banks will be required to calculate 
these projected outflows based on a scenario set by su-
pervisors and regulators that will incorporate conditions 
similar to those experienced during the crisis. 
The second ratio introduced under Basel III is the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), which will serve as a 
gauge of a bank’s long-term liquidity.  The NSFR is also 
similar to the dynamic liquidity ratios discussed above in 
that it requires banks to estimate the behavior of certain 
assets and liabilities over time.  However, the compo-
nents of the ratio’s numerator and denominator differ 
from those of the ratios considered above, and the one-
Figure 3 – Proposed Liquidity Standards Under Basel III 
Ratio  Description  Implementation Timeline 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)  High Quality Liquid Assets /  
Net Cash Outflows (30-day period)        ≥ 100% 
Observation Period: January 1, 2011 
Formal Implementation: January 1, 2015 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)  Amount of Available Stable Funding /  
Amount of Required Stable Funding       ≥ 100% 
Observation Period: January 1, 2011 
Formal Implementation: January 1, 2018 
Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision   year time frame is considerably longer than the short-term 
time frame currently employed by many regulators in Asia 
and other countries.  Although the ratio’s calculation is 
somewhat complex, it essentially requires banks to main-
tain enough funding that is expected to be stable to cover 
potential uses of funds over a one-year period.  The com-
ponents of both the numerator and denominator are 
weighted to reflect their inherent liquidity risk. 
Although neither ratio will be fully implemented until later 
this decade, regulators began an observation period on 
January 1, 2011.   During this period, regulators will moni-
tor the ratios for banks that they determine will be subject 
to the new requirements.
21  Regulators will also continue to 
review the potential implications of these standards, leav-
ing themselves time to address any unintended and adverse 
consequences prior to full implementation.
22 
Conclusion 
Because the observation period for the two new global li-
quidity ratios began only a few months ago, it is difficult to 
judge the likely overall impact of the new standards on 
global liquidity risk management and crisis prevention.   
Further, many details regarding full implementations have 
yet to be finalized by regulators at the national level.  De-
spite the uncertainty regarding the standards’ final form, it 
is clear that the goal of the standards is to “significantly 
reduce the probability and severity of banking crises in the 
future.”
23  Notably, some observers have argued that Asian 
regulators’ early focus on prudential liquidity standards 
was one factor that helped the region avoid the worst of the 
global financial crisis.
24   Although these standards may 
have contributed to the relative lack of liquidity problems 
in Asia during the crisis, regulators are moving towards 
adopting even stronger uniform standards at a global level. 
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